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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The following review of Australia’s retirement savings system takes 1992 as the beginning of 
compulsory mass superannuation in Australia with the introduction of the Superannuation 
Guarantee (SG).  Today, in 2002, the SG has reached its maximum levy of nine per cent of 
salary for most employees.  While our review necessarily considers issues of national 
economic policy and of aggregation, our central concern is that of those individual members 
of a superannuation fund, and that of how such members can maximise their retirement 
benefit.  Our perspective is that of financial economists; we apply standard finance 
technology to evaluate the performance of superannuation funds and the markets in which 
they operate in order to come to a view as to whether the superannuation industry is efficient. 
 
The Australian superannuation system places trustees in the key role of managing 
superannuation assets and we subject the role of trustee to close scrutiny while identifying the 
very substantial principal-and-agent problems that exist in the industry.  We consider two 
policy issues: member choice of fund and portability of accumulated balances in the light of 
how they would improve the ability of individual members to maximise retirement benefits 
and the efficiency of the system.  We argue that the award superannuation scheme which 
requires, by conditions in industrial awards, contributions of three per cent of wage or salary 
of an employee continues along side the SG scheme is due for review.  While there is an 
extensive literature on taxation of superannuation funds, we do not consider this issue except 
to note that taxation concession to superannuation are substantial and are projected to be of 
the order of $10.5 billion in 2002-3 (Department of Finance and Administration 2002). 
 
 
2. THE OLD SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
 
The old system, the system that prevailed before the introduction of compulsory 
superannuation initiatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was predominately a defined 
benefit system restricted to public sector employees and managerial employees of the private 
sector.  Much of the system, particularly in respect of the Commonwealth government, was 
unfunded and retirement benefit were meet on an emerging cost basis.  That other schemes 
may have been unfunded was not a problem in the face of poor preservation and vesting 
requirements.  Some evidence on the extent of vesting in 1984 is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Members of Private Sector Life Administered Employee 
Funds 
 Resignation Retrenchment Dismissal Early Retirement 
Own Contributions or less 5.8 4.3 15.6 2.8 
Own contributions plus 
interest 
29.9 18.0 
 
33.0 11.2 
Own contributions plus 
interest and partial vesting 
41.3 34.2 33.2 21.6 
Full vesting 21.2 41.7 16.7 62.5 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1988, Superannuation Funds Australia 1984-5, Catalogue No. 5649.0. 
 
Generally the incidence of complete vesting was low and preservation requirement were not 
stringent.1  Other parts of the system were run through life offices.2  
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion on the history of superannuation see Robinson (1992) and the Insurance and 
Superannuation Commission (1995, 1996). 
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2A. COVERAGE OF THE OLD SCHEME 
 
The proportion of employees covered by superannuation under the old scheme was relatively 
low especially for part-time workers.  In 1988, 58 per cent of full time employers, 19 per cent 
of part-time workers and only 2 per cent of persons not employed were covered by a 
superannuation scheme (ABS 1988).  As illustrated below, coverage varied widely over the 
industry groups. 
 
 
Figure 1: Superannuation Coverage by Industry, Australia, 1988. 
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Moreover, the introduction of award superannuation had a greater impact in the private sector 
as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Type of Superannuation Coverage, Australia, 1988, Per Cent of Employees 
Provider Public Sector Private Sector Total 
Current Employer 89.1 75.0 80.3 
In conjunction with a union 9.2 16.2 14.8 
Not in conjunction with a union 76.7 58.9 65.6 
Privately arranged 10.3 26.3 18.6 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ABS 1988 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 For example, some Australian universities adopted superannuation schemes which were operated by the 
purchase of life insurance policies that matured on the retirement age of the employee; there are some remnants 
of these schemes still in existence. 
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2B. REASONS FOR CHANGE 
 
Dawkins (1992) explained that the new Superannuation Guarantee (SG) was introduced to 
meet the urgent need for much greater self-provision for retirement income through 
compulsory superannuation contributions and that there was a need to strengthen Australia’s 
national saving performance.3  “Greater domestic saving will relax the current account 
constraint on Australia’s economic performance.  It will mean that we can grow faster 
without relying so heavily on foreign saving and building up an unsustainable foreign debt.”  
Implementation of the SG was projected “to increase national saving by about seven-tenths 
of one per cent of GDP by the year 2005, and by one-and-one-quarter percentage points of 
GDP within forty years (Dawkins 1992).”  The Department of Finance and Administration 
(2002) claims that the key objectives of compulsory superannuation when introduced in 
1992-3 were greater private sector provision for retirement and to assist lower income 
workers to live better in retirement through a combination of the age pension supplemented 
with tax assisted superannuation. 
 
Howe (1989) claimed that the “SGC initiative is directed at swelling the pool of private 
savings potentially available to fund retirement.”  Important associated aspects of the new 
policy with the SG were the strengthening of the current preservation requirements and a 
phased increase in the preservation age.  The government’s preferred position was for a total 
contribution of 12 per cent comprising an ultimate 9 per cent of salary and a 3 per cent 
contribution by employees.  The prescribed schedule of SGC contributions is shown in  
Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3: Prescribed SGC Contributions, 1992-2003 
 Employer’s Payroll 
$1 million or less 
Per Cent 
Employer’s Payroll 
More than $1 million 
Per Cent 
July 1, 92 to Dec 31, 1992 3 4 
July 1, 93 to June 30, 1993 3 5 
1993-4 3 5 
1994-5 4 5 
1995-6 5 6 
1996-7 6 6 
1997-8 6 6 
1998-9 7 7 
1999-00 7 7 
2000-01 8 8 
2001-02 8 8 
2002-03 9 9 
Source: Howe (1989) 
 
2C. SUMMARY OF THE OLD SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
 
In summary, we identify seven key features of the old superannuation system: 
 
1. Primarily oriented to public sector employees and managerial employees of the 
private sector. 
2. Poor coverage of part time workers. 
3. Defined benefit funds formed a significant part of the total scheme. 
                                                 
3 Current practice is to refer to the Superannuation Guarantee as the “SG” and to the Superannuation Guarantee 
Charge as the “SGC”.  This practice is of relative recent origin as Dawkins refers to the SG as the SGC.  Earlier 
it was also common to refer to the SG as the “SGL”. 
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4. Poor vesting and preservation requirements. 
5. Life offices important in the administration of superannuation assets. 
6. System challenged by inflation.  
7. The rise of new fund managers. 
 
 
4. THE NEW SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
 
The new system comprises the following elements: 
 
1. Compulsory award based superannuation under which three per cent of wages and 
salaries is paid to a fund specified in the award. 
2. The Superannuation Guarantee (SG) under which employers are required to make 
payments of a specified proportion of wage and salaries to a complying 
superannuation fund of the employers’ choice.  Failure to pay the SG results in a 
penalty payment by the employer the Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC). 
3. Occupational superannuation schemes, which may be compulsory for employees, 
under which employers pay an amount greater than the SG to a complying fund of the 
employer’s choice and which may be matched by a required contribution from 
employees.4 
4. DIY schemes, these are small Self Managed Superannuation Funds (SMSF) regulated 
by the Australian Taxation Office. 
5. Voluntary contributions by members to the schemes above. 
6. Personal superannuation schemes, unrelated to occupational superannuation schemes 
in a retail fund. 
 
The government provided annuity, the age pension, continues to be the major source of 
income support for retired persons in Australia at December 2001, over 67 per cent of the 
population received a full or a part pension.  A further 13 per cent receive a service pension 
(Department of Family and Community Services 2002).  The proportion of retired people on 
the age pension is unlikely to decline in the future due to the low workforce participation rate 
of people aged 45 and over.  Currently, some 38 per cent of people aged 55 to 64 years are in 
receipt of Commonwealth government income support (Department of Family and 
Community Services 2002).  The projections of expenditure on the age pension by the 
Commonwealth, show that expenditure on the age pension will rise from 2.9 per cent of GDP 
in 2001-2 to 4.6 per cent in 2041-2 (Commonwealth of Australia 2002). 
 
Part of the increase in the proportion of the age pension has been a result of government 
policy changes that have relaxed the eligibility conditions.  Also important has been the trend 
to earlier retirement and the ability to take superannuation retirement benefits as a lump sum.  
The time between early retirement and age 65 years is financed by running down a lump sum 
to fulfil the eligibility requirements for the age pension (Department of Finance and 
Administration 2002).  Even retirees with relatively large lump sums can qualify for the 
pension (and financial planners have developed easily implemented tactics to do so).  The 
maximum age pension for a couple is currently over $18,000 a year and the means tests 
allows this to be received by a couple owning their own home and having over $200,000 in 
assets.  We would conclude that, in the current environment, there is no feasible change to 
                                                 
4 The superannuation scheme for Australian Universities is of this type; membership of the scheme is a 
condition of employment for university employees.  The universities pay 14 per cent of salary and employees 
pay 7 per cent of after tax salary to the fund that is operated by the employers’ consortium. 
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superannuation arrangements, which will reduce dependency on the age pension over the 
next 40 years.  A summary view of the New Superannuation System is shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Assets and Membership by Type of Fund, Australia, March 2002 
Type of Fund Number 
of Funds 
Assets 
$Billion 
Accounts 
Million 
% of 
Assets 
% of 
Accounts 
Average Assets 
per Account 
($‘000) 
Corporate 2771 72 1.5 14.4 6.2 48000 
Industry 128 48 7.3 9.6 30.4 6575 
Public Sector 91 110 2.8 22.0 11.7 39285 
Retail 251 173 12.0 34.7 50.0 14416 
Small Funds 233903 97 0.4 19.4 1.7 242500 
Total  237144 499 24.0 100.0 100.0 20792 
Source: APRA Superannuation Statistics, March 2002. 
 
 
SMSFs are numerically the most common type of fund being designed for self employed 
persons.  Corporate funds are funds run by private sector corporations for their employees 
with membership restricted to particular occupational groups; public sector funds are funds of 
public sector employees; industry funds are those established for the receipt of award 
superannuation and retail funds are public offer funds open to the general public for personal 
superannuation scheme and to employer schemes.  Most accounts are held in the industry and 
retail funds as most new entrants to the superannuation system would be members of these 
funds.  A marked feature of the system is the fragmentation of accumulated balances as most 
employees are, on average, a member of four funds.  The low average balances in such funds 
is a product of these two factors.  The average balance in the public sector funds under-
reports the actual value of superannuation to members as their entitlement to a defined 
retirement benefit is not shown in present value terms in accounts of unfunded schemes.  The 
Commonwealth governments superannuation schemes, the Commonwealth Superannuation 
Scheme, CSS, which replaced an earlier scheme in 1976, was itself closed to new entrants in 
1990 when a new Commonwealth scheme, the Public Sector Superannuation Scheme, PSS, 
was established.  As at June 1999, this fund had an estimated unfunded liability of over $42 
billion or about 10 per cent of the total superannuation assets in Australia. (Figure 2.) 
 
 
Figure 2.  Assets of Superannuation Funds, Australia, Public Sector and Private 
Sector, 1995 to 2002. 
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4A. COVERAGE OF THE NEW SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
 
In 1999, nearly 97 per cent of full time employees, and 76 per cent of part time employees, 
were covered by superannuation; this a 91 per cent coverage of all employees, 
Commonwealth Treasury (2002). 
 
4B. TYPE OF FUND: DEFINED BENEFIT OR ACCUMULATION FUNDS 
 
The type of retirement benefit produced for the member can classify superannuation funds; 
either defined benefit or defined contribution (or accumulation) funds.  Defined benefit 
scheme promise members a retirement benefit defined, usually, in terms of final salary either 
as a lump sum (x times final salary) or a pension (y% of final salary a year).  Defined 
contribution funds define a contribution from members (z% of salary) and the retirement 
benefit is the accumulated values of these contributions together with accrued interest.  A 
defined contribution fund makes no binding promises as to the retirement benefit but tries to 
maximize this value on a best endeavours basis.  The fundamental difference between the 
funds lies in the allocation of investment risk, specifically the question of who wears poor 
investment returns.  In a defined benefit scheme the investment risk falls on the sponsor of 
the scheme (usually the employer) while in a defined contribution scheme the investment risk 
is borne entirely by the member of the fund.  If the fund performs poorly the retirement 
benefit of the member in a defined contribution scheme will be low, therefore, this type of 
benefit has risk/return similarities with equity capital. 
 
The great majority of members of the New Superannuation scheme in Australia are members 
of defined contributions schemes, as shown in Figure 3, which means that the risks of poor 
investment performance to the average Australian is substantial.  As we note elsewhere in the 
paper the risks borne by members of most defined benefit schemes are low and the question 
of prudential regulation of defined benefit funds is a very low priority. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Proportion of members of Superannuation Funds in Accumulation Funds. 
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4C. ASSET ALLOCATION 
 
Asset allocation is the investment composition of superannuation fund portfolios.  As all asset 
classes do not have the same expected return/risk profile, portfolio composition decisions will 
affect the performance of the fund and the risk to which individual members are exposed.  
The aggregate asset allocation of funds is shown in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5: Superannuation Asset Allocation, 1994-5 to 2001-2; Per Cent of Total Assets 
 Cash Loans and 
Placements 
Interest – Bearing 
Securities 
Equities Land and 
Buildings 
Other 
Assets 
Assets 
overseas 
1994-5 6 4 26 37 7 4 15 
1995-6 6 4 25 39 7 4 15 
1996-7 6 5 24 40 6 4 16 
1997-8 7 5 23 39 6 4 16 
1998-9 7 5 23 38 6 4 17 
1999-0 6 5 19 42 5 3 18 
2000-1 7 5 16 45 6 3 18 
2001-2 7 4 16 46 5 3 19 
Source: Calculated from APRA 2002 
 
 
The general trend in asset allocation has been to move away from domestic fixed interest 
assts to domestic and overseas equities.  There are two reasons for this.  The first is the 
attempt to gain the equity premium and to diversify the portfolio internationally.  The second 
is more mundane, but institutionally important for the future of superannuation asset 
management.  The size of the Australian fixed interest market and the domestic equities 
market will not allow great allocation to these areas.  The total assets on issue in these 
markets is shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6: Superannuation and Available Financial Assets, 1990 to 2001, $ Billion 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
ASX 
(Domestic 
Equities) 
New 
Capital 
Raisings - 
ASX 
Government 
Securities on 
Issue – 
Commonwealth 
Government 
Securities on 
Issue – 
State 
Total 
Superannuation 
Assets 
1990 162.7 7.4 25.6 17.6  
1991 167.2 9.1 29.1 16.1  
1992 198.3 14.3 41.6 13.6  
1993 227.7 15.8 60.5 11.1  
1994 287.6 17.0 77.1 10.0  
1995 299.1 14.0 94.7 8.1 229.4 
1996 347.0 15.3 104.2 4.5 262.7 
1997 444.4 25.3 106.1 3.7 321.6 
1998 488.9 28.8 93.6 1.9 361.0 
1999 568.3 33.0 86.9 1.8 412.2 
2000 682.0 32.6 77.6 1.2 490.5 
2001 746.3 na 69.2 0.7 524.4 
Source: RBA Statistical Bulletin; ASX; APRA. 
 
Three points are notable.  Commonwealth government securities on issue have actually 
declined since 1996, so much so that there is doubt as to whether the government bond 
market can survive; the Commonwealth government is to release an issues paper on this 
matter in September/October 2002.  At the end of 2001, Australian superannuation funds’ 
aggregate holdings of domestic equities represented about 24 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation; since not all equities are available to the superannuation funds (e.g. Telstra Ltd 
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is 50.1 per cent owned by the government, some equities are held by other listed companies 
such as the listed investment companies) this is significant both in the operations of the 
equities market and in the prospective returns superannuation funds can earn through 
equities.  The total SG contributions are of the order of $16+ billion a year, so investment of 
this sum into domestic equity markets poses some issues when new capital raisings are only 
twice this sum.  In general the asset allocation has moved to increased riskiness and 
variability of returns; credit risk is increased if more non-government fixed interest securities 
are held in the portfolio.  While increased holdings of equities would, on average, see higher 
long run returns to the portfolio, the cost is greater volatility of returns.  The volatility of 
returns of the major asset classes over the past 10 years is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Risk and Return Profile of Major Asset Classes 
Asset Class  Mean return (in AUD) % p.a. 
(unweighted) 
Standard deviation 
Australian shares 11.5 8.2 
International Shares 12.2 18.0 
Listed Property Trusts 12.4 6.5 
Australian fixed interest 9.7 6.1 
International fixed interest 10.9 12.1 
Cash 6.2 1.3 
Calculated from ASSIRT data 
 
The volatility of international asset classes is increased by the volatility of the dollar.  
Australian fixed interest and cash reflect the high rates of the early 1990s.  The advantage of 
investors seeking the equity premium is shown in Figure 4 where the estimated returns to a  
 
Table 8: Hypothetical Asset Allocation Weights, Per cent of Total 
Portfolio Australian 
Shares 
International 
Shares 
Listed 
Property 
Trusts 
Australian 
Fixed 
Interest 
International 
Fixed 
Interest 
Cash 
Conservative 0 0 0 20 20 60 
Cautious 15 5 5 45 15 15 
Balanced 30 10 10 30 10 10 
 
Figure4.  Returns to Conservative and Cautious Portfolios compared to Balanced 
Portfolio, Australia, 1992-2002. 
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hypothetical conservative portfolio and a hypothetical cautious portfolio are compared with a 
hypothetical balanced portfolio. The asset allocation weights for each portfolio are as shown 
in Table 8. 
 
In Figure 5 we estimate the return of superannuation funds over the period using the actual 
asset allocation and actual asset class return but making no allowance for expenses and  
 
Figure 5.  Estimated Returns to Australian Superannuation Funds, 1994-5 to 2001-2. 
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costs.  The point of the chart is that it reinforces the points that returns to superannuation 
funds will be largely determined by asset allocation and the riskiness of the portfolio by the 
proportion of assets allocated to equities.  The long boom in equity prices was from 1995-6 to 
1999-2000 so, in this time frame, increased allocation to equities produced a higher return; in 
2000-1, the story is different as exposure to equities in a bear market reduces returns. 
 
We would generally support a life cycle approach to the asset allocation for members where 
the proportion of the portfolio allocated to risky assets decreases with increasing age (Malkiel 
1999); this receives support from Campbell and Viceira (2002) who also note that time 
preference and risk attitudes can have large effects on optimal portfolios.  It is general very 
difficult for members to maintain a conservative portfolio due to the declining amount of 
bonds outstanding; furthermore a conservative asset allocation over the long term would look 
for indexed bonds to form a large component of the bond portfolio. 
 
4D. SUMMARY OF THE NEW SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
 
The New Superannuation System can be characterised as 
 
1. high coverage of employees; 
2. nearly all employees who entered the system since 1992 are members of a defined 
contribution or accumulation fund; 
3. members bear the investment risk; 
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4. members retirement values depend on the return to the fund’s portfolio and the 
expenses incurred by the fund; 
5. vesting and preservation are completed to create an ill-liquid and long term asset for 
members; 
6. asset allocation decisions are limited by the availability in the aggregate of some 
assets; 
7. high and increasing risk for members. 
 
 
5. ROLE OF TRUSTEES 
 
The New Superannuation system places trustees in the key position for the operation and 
management of funds; trustees are the legal owners of the assets of the superannuation funds.  
Trustees make decisions about the asset allocation and asset selection of funds.  We examine 
their roles in greater detail. 
 
5A. TRUSTS  
 
Trusts are legal devices that separate legal and beneficial ownership of assets.5  Under a trust, 
the trustee legally owns the assets of the trust but is required to manage the assets for the 
benefit of the person or persons nominated by the legal instrument that sets up the trust.  
Trusts may be created in a variety of ways, the most common of which is the trust deed, 
which also authorises the trustee to hold the trust assets in particular forms. 
 
Trustees have certain duties to perform in relation to the management of trust assets; these 
have been explained in the following way in an extract from the Model Code.6 
 
“In the exercise of his powers of investment the trustee shall consider:- 
 
(a) The trust funds as a whole, the nature, composition and purposes of the trust and its 
anticipated duration; 
(b) The needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries. 
(c) The suitability of the investments held and of investments proposed. 
(d) The need for diversification of investments. 
(e) The administrative costs, including commission, fees, charges and duties  payable, of 
making or varying any investment. 
(f) The taxation consequences of making or varying any investment. 
(g) The possible impact of inflation or deflation.” 
 
The trustee is, thus, to take into account the particular circumstances and needs of the 
beneficiary and, under certain circumstances, the opinion and desires of the beneficiaries as 
well as the extent of the trust powers before deciding on the appropriate investments.  The 
duties of trustees are, in fact, to act as portfolio managers and to allocate trust assets to 
                                                 
5 A legal description of a trust is “a trust exists when the holder of a legal or equitable interest in certain property 
is bound by an equitable obligation to hold his interest in that property not for his own exclusive benefit, but for 
the benefit, as to the whole or part of such interest, of another person or persons or for some object or purpose 
permitted by law.”  Meagher and Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia, fifth edition, Sydney, 
Butterworths, 1986, p7 
6  Further explanation of the legal basis of these duties is given in Ford and Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts, 
Sydney, Law Book Company, 1990 and Lee (ed), Model Trustee Code for Australian States and Territories, 
Working Party, 1989 
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securities to further the goals of the trust.  There are no formal qualifications for a trustee so 
that inexperienced persons not versed in financial management may be appointed. 
 
5B. THE PRUDENT PERSON APPROACH 
 
All Australian jurisdictions have now adopted the prudent person approach to the duties of 
trustees.  In 1995, the South Australia parliament approved a new approach to authorised 
trustee status in that State by moving to a prudent person approach but made an important 
innovation by codifying the factors that should be considered by a trustee in exercising 
investment powers.  The power of trustee to invest is expressed in the following way: 
 
A trustee, unless expressly forbidden by the instrument creating the trust, may:7 
 
(a) Invest trust funds in any form of investments, and 
(b) at any time, vary an investment or realise an investment of trust funds and  reinvest 
money resulting from the realisation of any form of investment. 
 
A trustee, if a professional manager of funds for other people, must exercise the care, 
diligence and skill that a prudent person engaged in that profession would exercise in 
managing the affairs of other persons or otherwise must exercise the care, diligence and skill 
that a prudent person of business would exercise in managing the affairs of other persons.  A 
trustee must comply with the rules and principles of law that impose duties on a trustee to: 
 
(a) Exercise the powers of a trustee in the best interests of all present and future 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
(b) Invest trust funds in investments that are not speculative or hazardous. 
(c) Act impartially towards beneficiaries and between different classes of beneficiaries. 
(d) Take advice. 
 
The trustee must pay attention to the following matters in exercising powers of investment. 
The trustee must have regard to: 
 
(a) The purposes of the trust and the needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries. 
(b) The desirability of diversifying trust investments. 
(c) The nature of and risk associated with existing trust investments and other trust 
property. 
(d) The need to maintain the real value of the capital or income of the trust. 
(e) The risk of capital or income loss or depreciation. 
(f)  The potential for capital appreciation. 
(g) The likely income return and the timing of income return. 
(h)  The length of the term of the proposed investment. 
(i) The probable duration of the trust. 
(j) The liquidity and marketability of the proposed investment during, and on the 
determination of, the term of the proposed investment. 
(k) The aggregate value of the trust. 
(l)  The effect of the proposed investment in relation to the tax liability of the trust. 
(m) The likelihood of inflation affecting the value of the proposed investment or other 
trust property. 
(n)  The costs (including commissions, fees, charges and duties payable) of making the 
proposed investment. 
                                                 
7  Trustee (Investment Powers) Amendment Act 1995 (SA) 
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(o) The results of a review of existing trust investments. 
 
In carrying out their duties, trustees may obtain and consider independent and impartial 
advice reasonably required for the investment of trust funds or the management of the 
investment from a person whom the trustee reasonably believes to be competent to give the 
advice and to pay the reasonable costs of obtaining such advice from trust funds.  
Furthermore, the Act provides that a court may offset gains and losses arising from 
investment of a trustee when there is an action for breach of trust against the trustee.8 
 
 
6. LACK OF COMPETITION 
 
The New Superannuation System is characterised by lack of competition arising from 
members having no choice of fund either in relation to contributions or of accumulated 
balances; some members have investment choice or individual asset allocation but, as far as 
we are aware, no one has individual choice of asset selection.  Superannuation is a captive 
market and contains no incentives for efficiency, cost reduction or maximising returns to the 
portfolio.  The uncompleted change to the New Superannuation System is member choice of 
fund and member decision on portability of balances. 
 
6A. CHOICE OF FUND AND PORTABILITY OF ACCUMULATED BALANCES 
 
The Commonwealth Government announced a policy of choice of fund in 1996 and 
introduced a detailed proposal in the 1997 Budget.  Specific proposals for choice of fund 
were introduced into Parliament in December 1997.  Originally introduced as Schedule 5 to 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 1997, the choice legislation was re-introduced on 
November 12, 1998 in revised form as the Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice 
of Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998.  This Bill passed in the House of Representatives in 
February 16, 1999, but debate on the Bill in the Senate was adjourned on February 1999; the 
Bill was defeated in the Senate in August 2001. 
 
The Commonwealth Government introduced new legislation, Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) 2002 in the House of Representatives on June 
27, 2002; this Bill was referred to the Senate Select Committee on Superannuation on August 
21, 2002 for report due September 26, 2002.  The Assistant Treasurer has released a 
discussion paper on portability.  The Commonwealth Treasury (2002) has stated that the 
Government considers that choice and portability of superannuation in conjunction with 
improved consumer disclosure will increase competition and provide benefits to fund 
members. 
 
We have argued that member choice and portability of balances should be unrestricted (Drew 
and Stanford, 2002) which supports the Wallis Committee recommendations, although we 
discount the potential difficulties as envisaged by the Committee.  We see considerable 
                                                 
8 Under The Trustee Investments Acts 1961 (UK) trustees are required to divide the trust funds into two parts 
referred to as the “narrow-range part and the wider-range part”.  Some investments eligible for inclusion in the 
narrow-range part, typically risk-free fixed interest securities whose capital value does not fluctuate, may be 
selected by the trustee without advice whereas the trustee may select other securities whose capital value may 
fluctuate (typically government long term securities, mortgages on freeholds or long leaseholds) only after first 
obtaining expert advice.  The trustee is not required to hold securities which are eligible for inclusion in the 
wider-range part (such securities are ordinary shares) but if such securities are held the trustee must obtain prior 
expert advice, which must be in writing, from a person believed by the trustee to be qualified.  The trustee 
cannot repose blind faith in the expert advice because the trustee must act personally and cannot delegate such 
decisions. 
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efficiencies arising from member choice and portability of balances not the least being the 
consolidation of multiple accounts.  As a result of the existing employer choice of fund most 
employees are members of more than one fund; Rice and McEwan (2002) estimate that the 
average number of accounts per person is three and despite the attempts the problem 
continues as the number of accounts continues to grow faster than the labour force.  Rice and 
McEwan (2002) estimate that the potential annual savings of elimination of 50 per cent of 
account is of the order of $500 million. 
 
 
7. COSTS OF SUPERANNUATION FUNDS 
 
The costs of running superannuation funds varies better funds but is increasing as more 
accounts are held with high cost funds. Examples of funds costs are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Superannuation Fund Costs 
Type of Fund Cost:  
Investment  
% of funds under 
management 
Cost: 
Administration 
% of funds under 
management 
Cost: 
Distribution 
% of funds under 
management 
Total 
Expense 
Rate 
% 
Large Corporate 
Wholesale 
0.34 0.38 0.33 1.05 
Large Corporate 
Employer Master 
Trust 
0.40 0.35 0.10 0.85 
Large Industry 0.45 0.60 0.10 1.15 
Government 0.20 
 
0.23 0.00 0.43 
Retail - Small 
Retail Employer 
Master Trust 
0.60 0.90 0.50 2.00 
Retail - Personal 
Super 
1.24 0.60 0.50 2.34 
Note: These costs exclude entry and exit fees.  Source: Rice and McEwan (2002) 
 
What is important in accounting for costs of superannuation funds is access to wholesale 
investment rates (we discuss this later in the paper) and distribution costs.  On both counts, 
retail funds have comparatively high costs.  Costs of government funds are low because the 
administration of superannuation has been integrated into the payroll function and many 
government funds are un-funded. 
 
 
8. INVESTMENT RETURNS TO FUNDS 
 
Trustees are required under SIS to formulate and give effect to an investment strategy 
appropriate for fund members.  Trustees have statutory powers allowing them to engage asset 
consultant to assist in the formulation of this strategy and assist in striking mandates with 
asset managers.  In exploring the issue of investment efficiency of Australia’s superannuation 
assets, we examine the performance of superannuation funds specialising in the management 
of Australian equities.9  These studies have considered two cohorts of funds, retail and 
wholesale funds.10 
                                                 
9 The Australian equities asset class is selected as it accounts for some 40 per cent of current superannuation 
assets, www.apra.gov.au 
10 For an examination of the relationship between fund size and performance see Drew, Stanford and Hoffman 
(2002). 
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We commence the analysis with an examination of retail superannuation fund performance 
(Drew and Stanford 2001a, 2003).  In these studies, Morningstar Research Pty Ltd 
(Morningstar), an independent measurement service in Australia, provided monthly return 
observations (net of management fees, excluding entry and exit loads) for every retail 
superannuation fund classified as ‘Retail Superannuation Fund Australian Equity – General’, 
from January 1991 through December 1999.  The sample of 148 funds was complete in the 
sense that it contained all of the funds with no missing data and was maintained by the same 
independent data collection agency throughout the period (Drew and Stanford 2001b).  The 
average retail fund investigated in these studies charged investors a management fee of 1.8 
per cent per annum (with a range 1.5 to 2.5 per cent per annum).11  This compares with the 
Rice and McEwan (2002) figure of retail personal superannuation costs of 1.24 per cent; we 
have, at this juncture, no explanation of the difference but it may be due to different coverage 
or to a decline in costs.  Table 10 presents the results of retail fund performance for the period 
1991 through 1999. 
 
Table 10: Risk-Adjusted Retail Superannuation Fund Return Estimates 
Alpha (α) is estimated from the cross-sectional time series regression of the excess fund returns on the excess 
market return and the mimicking returns for the size (Rst -Rlt), style (Rgt -Rvt) and bond (Rdt -Rft) factors: Rit - Rft = αi 
+ βmt(Rmt -Rft) + βsi(Rst -Rlt) + βgi(Rgt -Rvt) + βdi(Rdt -Rft) + εi.  The excess market return, Rmt -Rft, is the difference 
between the return on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Top 100 Accumulation Index (with the ASX Top 20 
Accumulation index used as a confirmatory proxy) and the return on the Reserve Bank of Australia 13-Week 
Treasury Note in month t.  The size factor is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the common size anomaly in 
stock returns.  The style factor is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the common book-to-market equity 
anomaly in stock returns.  Finally, the bond factor is the return on the mimicking portfolio of domestic fixed 
interest securities to limit the defects of asset coverage.  βk is the factor loading on the corresponding independent 
variable. All t-statistics are provided in the brackets.  Performance measures are in percentage return per month on 
an equal-weight basis. 
 
Rmt = ASX Top 100 accumulation index 
Cohort α 
Retail open-end -0.0282 
(0.14) 
Retail closed-end -0.0671 
(-0.66) 
Retail non-surviving -0.2541 
(-0.85) 
All retail funds -0.0416 
(-0.44) 
Basis points (p.a.) -50 
Rmt = ASX Top 20 accumulation index 
Retail open-end -0.0249 
(-0.11) 
Retail closed-end -0.1034 
(-0.74) 
Retail non-surviving -0.2273 
(-0.69) 
All retail funds -0.0777 
(-0.46) 
Basis points (p.a.) -93 
Source: Drew and Stanford (2003). 
 
The multifactor model estimates presented in Table 10 suggest that managers under-perform 
the market by a range of -50 to –93 basis points per annum.  Moreover, the evidence 
presented on the other three explanatory variables (size, style and domestic fixed interest 
securities) illuminates some important issues for the management of superannuation assets.  
                                                 
11 It is important to note that the analysis undertaken in Drew and Stanford (2001a, 2003) was specifically 
concerned with evaluating the skill of asset managers.  As such, the impact of entry and exist loads was 
excluded from the analysis.  The average entry load of a retail fund was 3.7 per cent (with the maximum entry 
load at 5%) and the exit load was 2.0 per cent (maximum of 3%). 
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First, an examination of the regression coefficients in Table 10 suggests that the funds 
investigated during the sample period held equities that were smaller than the combination of 
equities in the ASX Top 100 and Top 20 accumulation index.  This suggests that managers 
are being strategic in their behaviour, investing in small-capitalisation stocks outside popular 
benchmarks.  The existence of a size factor in the sample provides further evidence of the 
strength of the multifactor model. 
 
Second, a statistically significant explanatory variable was the excess return on a portfolio of 
domestic fixed interest securities above the risk-free rate.  This finding highlights that 
investors engaging specialist domestic stock managers are, typically, investing in a portfolio 
that has a significant proportion (up to 20 per cent) of return contributed by lower volatile, 
fixed interest securities.  This relatively high proportion of domestic fixed interest exposure 
must be incorporated into the superannuation investor’s approach to the asset allocation 
problem.  Finally, dissimilar to the recent international evidence of Gruber (1996) the 
managers investigated in studies by study are not characterised by a particular stock selection 
style.  This is confirmed by the independent variable ‘style’ not being statistically different 
from zero at the 5 per cent level.  This issue warrants further investigation.  Specifically, the 
way in which managers actually select stocks requires a more detailed analysis to provide a 
statistically significant explanatory variable for the Australian experience.  A direction for 
future research may take the form of qualitative techniques (such as fund manager surveys) to 
shed light on this important issue.  This would also assist trustees in selecting or blending 
different managers to mitigate risk for fund members. 
 
We now turn our attention to the performance of the wholesale fund segment (Drew, Stanford 
and Veeraraghavan 2002).  Again, Morningstar provided monthly return observations (net of 
management fees, excluding entry and exit loads) for every wholesale superannuation fund 
classified as ‘Wholesale Pooled Superannuation Trust Australian Equity – General’, from 
January 1991 through April 1999.  A total of 30 funds are examined in the Drew et al., 
(2002) study.12  The annual average management fee of the sample was 0.74 per cent per 
annum.  A further defining feature of the sample of wholesale funds was that no entry or exit 
loads are levied by any of the managers.  The results presented in Table 11 are estimated 
from the same model as used in Table 10. 
                                                 
12 The wholesale open-end cohort consists of superannuation funds that are structured to accept investments 
from trustees.  The funds investigated in this study typically require a minimum investment of AUD 250,000, 
with minimum monthly contributions of AUD 20,000.  These funds are pooled and invested by a fund manager 
in a portfolio of general Australian equities.  Wholesale funds permit superannuation trustees to buy and sell at a 
unit price based on the appraised value of total assets.  Investors can leave and enter at any time and assets may 
be continually added to the fund.  A total of 26 open-end funds are investigated in this study.  Closed end retail 
funds no longer accept new investors or new investments from existing unitholders.  These are usually difficult 
funds for investors to exit owing to a lack of liquidity in the fund's underlying investments.  However, due to the 
fund being closed-end in nature, this allow the fund manager to be largely unaffected by the impact of large 
capital inflows and outflows from superannuation trustees.  This provides the investment manager with a degree 
of certainty regarding the assets under management.  The liquidity issues relating to exiting such funds have 
resulted in superannuation trustees being minimal users of these closed-end products.  A total of 2 wholesale 
closed-end funds are examined in this study.  The wholesale non-surviving cohort is comprised of funds that 
were terminated during the sample period.  The decision to finalise a fund is typically made by the investment 
manager.  The Australian wholesale market is characterised by a low mortality rate, with only 2 funds were 
terminated over the sample period. 
 
17 
Table 11: Risk-Adjusted Wholesale Superannuation Fund Return Estimates 
Rmt = ASX Top 100 Accumulation Index 
Cohort α 
Wholesale Open-end 
 
0.0051 
(0.02)  
Wholesale Closed-end 
 
0.0013 
(0.01) 
Wholesale Finalised 
 
-0.0005 
(0.01) 
All wholesale funds 
 
0.0045 
(0.02) 
Basis points (p.a.) +5 
Rmt = ASX Top 20 Accumulation Index 
Wholesale Open-end 
 
0.0041 
(0.02) 
Wholesale Closed-end 
 
-0.0007 
(0.01) 
Wholesale Finalised 
 
0.0011 
(0.02) 
All wholesale funds 0.0036 
(0.04) 
Basis points (p.a.) +4 
Source: Drew, Stanford and Veeraraghavan (2002). 
 
The empirical analysis undertaken in Table 11 provides partial answers to the question of 
whether low cost management is the best alternative for superannuation assets.  There is 
evidence over the observation period that, net of management fees, investment managers 
performed comparably to a passive asset selection strategy on a risk-adjusted basis.  
Moreover, the results provide little support to the position of Logue and Rader (1998) in 
advocating a strictly passive approach to asset selection.  While the results are supportive of 
the low cost management case, it is most important to note that the minimum investment 
amount into a wholesale fund is around AUD 250,000.  As such, we remain concerned that 
the market that is most accessible to the average superannuation investor is the retail market. 
 
In concluding the review, it is important to consider the controversial issue of performance 
persistence or the ‘hot hand’ anomaly.  Specifically, researchers (and trustees!) are concerned 
with whether the track record of an asset manager is information-rich regarding future 
performance.  Specifically, the hot hand anomaly suggests that the best performing managers 
can be selected on an ex-ante basis.  In practice, poor aggregate industry performance of the 
retail fund segment is purely academic if, and only if, a handful of asset managers can 
consistently earn economic rents (positive risk-adjusted returns) for members, and these 
managers can be selected by trustees and asset consultants ex-ante. 
 
Drew, Stanford and Taranenko (2001) and Drew, Stanford and Veeraraghavan (2003) have 
considered the hot hand issue in the context of retail superannuation funds.  Drew et al., 
(2002) commence their analysis of performance persistence in raw returns through an 
examination of how the best performing funds in one year perform the following year using 
Bogle’s (1995) framework.  To minimise the possibility of randomness in any single year, 
Drew et al., (2002) made comparisons of fund rankings in each year throughout the 1990s 
(i.e., how the top five, ten and twenty fund performers of 1991 ranked in 1992, through to 
how the best performing funds in 1998 performed in 1999). 
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Table 12: Rank Order of Retail Superannuation Funds, Raw Returns 
Raw returns Rank in 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average 
 Year one         Year two 
 1 68 49 66 132 12 112 127 57 78 
 2 77 86 33 131 1 109 128 112 85 
 3 78 9 50 124 7 2 26 113 51 
 4 62 10 19 94 139 120 27 114 73 
 5 11 86 18 95 138 1 125 51 66 
 6 69 87 25 130 135 83 126 55 89 
 7 70 37 12 128 130 10 20 123 66 
 8 71 38 13 129 71 5 21 124 56 
 9 72 85 4 127 34 6 22 120 55 
 10 66 84 5 125 35 16 24 121 60 
 11 67 4 53 126 118 15 30 122 67 
 12 47 35 34 123 119 54 31 126 71 
 13 48 36 35 121 113 139 25 128 81 
 14 63 75 37 122 114 138 28 127 88 
 15 64 76 67 120 115 137 123 130 104 
 16 74 77 59 118 124 132 124 131 105 
 17 75 78 60 117 125 44 9 10 65 
 18 55 79 64 100 121 38 10 13 60 
 19 56 69 65 99 122 39 11 9 59 
 20 40 70 37 31 123 40 7 117 58 
Summary of average raw returns (% p.a.) 
Top 5 funds 33.58 -2.22 27.17 -2.92 12.85 17.49 15.31 1.41 25.52 11.83 
           
Top 10 funds 28.67 -3.11 27.72 0.87 10.63 14.20 17.73 5.21 23.03 12.04 
           
Top 20 funds 24.69 -2.32 29.17 -2.88 11.07 11.83 16.53 7.33 23.91 11.83 
           
All funds 14.94 1.11 33.21 -3.97 16.61 13.84 11.76 7.34 31.28 13.90 
           
Market 15.78 -1.40 37.62 -7.78 20.15 12.32 15.17 12.57 33.09 15.22 
           
No. of funds 113 80 87 98 132 143 139 135 135 119 
Source: Drew, Stanford and Veeraraghavan (2002). 
 
The evidence provided in Table 12 suggests that a top performing fund in one year has borne 
no systematic relationship to its ranking in the subsequent year.  An equally weighted 
portfolio of the top five ranked funds in the first year provides a raw return of +33.58 percent, 
over double the average return for all funds of +14.94 per cent.  In the second year, the 
average return falls to +11.83 percent, below the average fund return of +13.90 percent.  
Funds that rank in the top five in a given year, on average, ranked 71 (of 119 funds) in the 
subsequent year.  We concur with Bogle (1995) in describing this as evidence of mean 
reversion.  When examining the question of performance persistence over a full decade, it 
appears from analysis that a strategy of investing in the best performing funds of the past year 
provides no ex-ante information regarding the selection of winners in the subsequent year.13 
 
The results from the performance evaluation and persistence studies suggests that any bias 
toward high-cost management strategies of superannuation assets by any stakeholders 
                                                 
13 The study by Drew et al., (2002) also conducted performance persistence tests on risk-adjusted returns 
reporting similar results.  Moreover, confirmatory measures including year-on-year regressions and non-
parametric tests also provide corroborating evidence of the null hypothesis that past fund performance data is 
simply that, it’s in the past. 
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(trustees, asset consultants, asset managers, and, most importantly, fund members) is 
unwarranted.  The lack of performance persistence in the retail fund segment is particularly 
concerning, with trustees and fund members being better served by a random choice of asset 
managers than using short-term performance as a selection criterion.  This raises the ‘prickly’ 
issue of how asset managers should be selected to manage superannuation assets.  Moreover, 
the empirical evidence presented highlights the need for regulators, trustees and fund 
members alike to employ as a matter of priority strategies to minimise the various impacts of 
the principal-agent problem in Australia’s contemporary superannuation arrangements. 
 
 
9. REGULATION OF SUPERANNUATION FUNDS 
 
Compulsory contributions to superannuation are made to privately managed funds that are 
subject to little regulation.  The Commonwealth government explicitly disclaims any 
responsibility of the outcome of private management of superannuation although there are 
national goals embodied in superannuation policy.  The Australian superannuation system has 
become an individual system; for any contributor individual contributions and the earnings on 
those contributions determine the terminal benefit received. 
 
Regulation of superannuation funds is the responsibility of the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, APRA, a body created from the recommendations of the Wallis 
Committee Report (1997).  Regulation is relatively light with no portfolio restrictions except 
to ensure arms length transactions.  As superannuation funds are organised as trusts, the 
responsibility for the performance of funds lies with trustees.  In addition to specific 
responsibilities in the superannuation regulatory regime, trustees have other legislative 
responsibilities and common law duties.  
 
It is important to determine the goals of regulation; we take it that the goal of regulation is to 
protect the interests of individual contributors and to ensure that the terminal value of their 
superannuation benefit is maximised.  
 
There is a major difference between the two types of funds: defined benefit funds and defined 
contribution funds.  As discussed previously, members of defined contribution funds are 
given no promises as to the terminal value of their retirement benefit; the superannuation 
will, on a best endeavours basis, attempt to maximise this benefit.  On the other hand, 
members of defined benefit funds are given an explicit promise or guarantee that they will 
receive a defined benefit, defined in terms, usually, of final salary.  If this benefit is received 
as a pension the concern about the quality of the guarantee will persist over a long time.  
What is critical to members of defined benefit schemes is the quality of this promise or 
guarantee.  Government has provided defined benefit schemes to their employees and large 
corporations to their managerial employees.  Many of these funds, particularly, of the 
government have been unfunded and the payment of benefits is met on an emerging cost 
basis. 
 
Again, it is important to note in this context that the major Commonwealth government 
superannuation schemes the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme, the CSS, and the 
Public Sector Superannuation Scheme, PSS, are unfunded and it is estimated that the 
unfunded liability of the these schemes is of the order of $40 billion or about 10 per cent of 
total reported assets of superannuation funds.  Despite this level of liability and the high cost 
of these funds, the CSS is estimated to have an employer cost of over 21 per cent of salary 
and the PSS over 14 per cent, the members of these funds can have faith in the quality of the 
promise or guarantee of their employer as it is backed by the sovereign credit of the 
 
20 
Commonwealth.  Some State government public sector superannuation schemes are fully 
funded (e.g. Queensland) but any problems due to under-funding or under-performance will 
be resolved by application of the explicit guarantee.  Concern about government defined 
benefit funds should rest with the taxpayer who ultimately funds the guarantee.  However, the 
long-term cost of government defined benefit schemes is projected to decrease as access to 
defined benefit schemes is reduced.  The CSS has been closed to new entrants since 1990 and 
the Commonwealth Government has proposed to close the PSS to new entrants although 
enabling legislation has failed to pass the Senate.   
 
Members of private sector defined benefit superannuation schemes may have some concerns 
about the quality of the promise regarding their retirement benefit. 
 
We ask further why individual contributors are not capable of protecting their own interests.  
The answer to this question lies in the existence of asymmetric information and agency 
problems.  Individual contributors have very little information about the operation of 
superannuation fund.  While they receive an annual report they have access to little 
information between reporting dates and are unable to form an opinion about the 
management and performance of the fund.  There are no general information sources about 
superannuation funds such as exist for credit ratings or companies listed on the stock market. 
Contributors have no choice of fund and are unable to transfer between funds in response to 
poor performance so that the ordinary market mechanisms to ensure performance do not 
apply.  Agency problems in superannuation funds are severe and the management of 
superannuation funds cannot be regarded as the agents of contributions except in the most 
formal legal sense.  The relationship between parties in a superannuation fund is as follows: 
the principal is the member or contributor to the superannuation fund; the principal has the 
following agents: 
 
(a) The employer is the agent who selects the fund for the member; and is the agent who 
selects half trustees in some funds. 
(b) The trustee is the agent who manages the fund on behalf of the principal. 
(c) The asset consultant is the agent of trustee who advises on investment strategy and choice 
of fund managers. 
(d) The funds manager is the agent of trustee who implements investment strategy. 
 
The power of principals is limited in that they cannot select the fund into which to direct 
contributions, they cannot select trustees as generally there is no direct method of election or 
appointment, they cannot give trustees direction, and they cannot remove trustees (apart from 
the normal trustee appointment cycle).  The only case where the principal can affect the 
behaviour of trustees is in a SMSF where all members of the fund must be trustees.  The 
method of selection of trustees for a selection of superannuation funds is summarised in 
Table 13. 
 
We have seen previously that a trustee is required to act in the interests of the beneficiary and 
should do so irrespective of how the appointment of trustee was made; the employer and 
trade unions have no interest in the operation of a superannuation fund and it seems 
anomalous that these parties should select trustees.  In retail funds the agency problem is 
complete; there are no circumstances under which a trustee would dismiss a funds manager.  
In general, we would expect it to be extremely difficult for members of a superannuation fund 
to vary the operation of a fund. 
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Table 13: Method of Selecting Superannuation Funds Trustees, Selected Funds 
Fund  Employer Trustees Employee Trustees Independent 
Trustee 
CSS  
(Public Sector) 
Appointed by 
Minister of Finance 
and Administration 
Appointed by Minister of Finance 
and Administration 
Two elected by 
Appointed 
Trustees 
UniSuper  
(Corporate) 
Nominated by 
Universities (2); 
Elected by 
Consultative 
Committee members 
who represent 
employers (2) 
Elected by Consultative Committee 
members who represent academic 
staff (1); Elected by Consultative 
Committee members who represent 
general staff (1); 
Nominated by national unions who 
represent a significant number of 
members of UniSuper (2) 
Appointed by 
other Trustees 
(2) 
REST (Retail 
Employees 
Superannuation 
Trust 
Appointed by major 
retail employers: 
Woolworths, Coles, 
and Australian 
Retailers 
Association 
 
Appointed by Shop Distributive 
Trades Union 
 
C+Bus Appointed by 
Master Builders’ 
Association 
Appointed by unions: 
CFMEU, AMWU, AWU 
Appointed by 
ACTU 
BT Personal 
Superannuation 
Fund 
Retail Fund Trustee is BT Funds Management 
Limited; the fund manager is Bankers 
Trust Life Limited which is 
subsidiary of parent company, 
Bankers Trust Australia Group.  
Directors of these companies are 
employees of the parent company 
 
 
Notes:  
(a) CSS is the accumulation fund; CSS is a hybrid scheme which has an unfunded defined benefit 
scheme and a defined contribution fund to invest award superannuation and other employee 
contributions. See Annual Report, 2002. 
(b) UniSuper is a hybrid fund with a funded defined benefit scheme and an accumulation fund for 
employee and award superannuation contributions. See Annual Report, 2002. 
(c) Details on REST and C+Bus accessed at rest.com.au and cbus.com.au respectively. 
(d) Data on BT Personal Superannuation Fund BT Investor Brochure. 
 
Some superannuation funds allow investment choice which is the choice of individual asset 
allocation; however, this does not change the operations of the fund and does not allow a 
complete choice to members e.g. does not allow for the choice of indexed funds.  We have 
also seen that there is no qualification required for the role of trustee and that the trustee may 
seek advice.  The asset consultant, the agent of trustee who advises on investment strategy 
and choice of funds manager; has an incentive to make that advice complicated in order to 
maintain a continuing role (and fees); asset consultants will invariably recommend that the 
trustee employs a number of active funds managers so that the asset will have a continued 
monitoring role.  The funds manager, the agent of trustee who implements investment 
strategy, has choice of asset selection and this is always active management.  Funds managers 
are remuneration not by success at obtaining excess returns but by a commission on the value 
of funds under management.  Asset consultants and funds managers have an important, but 
largely unrecognised, role as managers of trustees, that is, in being able to form the views of 
trustees.  Asset consultants and funds managers vehemently oppose the use of passive 
management of equity (and indeed other portfolios) because passive management denies 
them a role and their fees.  Monitoring of passively managed portfolios is simple; it involves 
little more than looking in the newspaper’s financial columns. 
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9A. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FUND PERFORMANCE 
 
One of the first studies to consider the principal-agent problem as it relates to the poor 
performance of the asset management industry was contributed by Lakonishok, Schleifer, and 
Vishny (1992).  Lakonishok et al., (1992) hypothesise that industry underperformance against 
stated benchmarks was the result of non-alignment of incentives of principals (trustees) and 
their agents (asset managers).  Moreover, Lakonishok et al., (1992) find that the costs 
associated with trustees monitoring the activities of asset managers to be high. 
 
Logue and Rader (1998) extend the analysis through an examination of the role of asset 
consultants in the principal-agent problem.  Logue and Rader (1998) suggest that trustees, in 
employing asset consultants to assist in the formulation of cogent investment strategy, create 
an asset consultant-asset manager problem.  They suggest that the incentives facing asset 
consultants result in them being “biased against economically appealing strategies that are 
passive in nature [pp. 197].”  This multi-faceted approach to the traditional bivariate 
principal-agent framework is appealing as it better reflects the contemporary institutional 
arrangements in Australia’s superannuation system.   
 
We consider the practicalities of this complex trustee-asset consultant-asset manager problem 
in superannuation from the perspective of the fund member.14  While Logue and Rader 
(1998) advocate a strictly passive approach to the management of retirement assets, we 
present the case for low cost management being the preferred option for superannuation 
assets.  The distinction between passive and low cost management is a subtle, but important 
one.  Passive management, or indexing, is low cost due to asset selection being determined by 
an individual asset’s contribution to an index.  Low cost investing may still take the form of 
active management (that is, taking active bets to be over- or under-weight an asset’s 
contribution to an index) that are at least comparable (preferably greater than) the index 
return on a risk-adjusted basis.  To make the case for low cost asset management, we rely on 
the findings of the studies previously reported in an earlier section of this paper. 
 
We expect that there is little that can be done to eliminate these principal and agent problems 
and to make the trustee regime more responsive to the requirements of members.  There is a 
more direct way to do so. This requires simply a policy change to allow for member choice of 
fund and full portability of accumulated balances along the lines suggested by the Wallis 
Committee (1997); this proposal has been examined in Drew and Stanford (2002).  The 
introduction those measures will bring some degree of market discipline to a superannuation 
regime which, to date, has been marked captive markets generating quasi-rents to 
participants.  Trustees and funds managers will respond to member requirements when failure 
to do so sees the shrinking of their business and remuneration.  The difficulties and costs of 
these measures is exaggerated by opponents who are seeking to protect vested interests and 
who deny the capacity of members to make informed choices. 
 
To deny the capacity of members to make rational choices is dangerous ground for an 
economist to attempt to hold.  The economic arguments for compulsory superannuation are 
only two: myopia and moral hazard.  Myopia obtains when economic agents who are willing 
to provide for their retirement postpone doing so because of short time horizons; when such 
agents reach the position that they are prepared to save for retirement it is then to late.  The 
moral hazard problem exists when agents capable of providing for their retirement do not do 
                                                 
14 For examination of the member choice debate from the perspective of the fund member, see Drew and 
Stanford (2002). 
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so because they hold the belief that the community will not allow them to starve in 
retirement. Both of these reasons are not enough to justify the case that economic agents 
cannot make a rational choice about the preferred fund for their superannuation contributions 
and a preferred funds manager.  Under current arrangements it is not rational for members of 
superannuation funds to acquire knowledge about superannuation because there are no 
benefits in doing so.  Members are unable to affect the operations of their superannuation 
fund so it is not rational to incur costs to find out more about superannuation in general and 
their fund in particular.  For most employees in Australia, superannuation evokes little 
interest and takes little of their time; they may see in their pay-slip the deduction for 
superannuation and may examine their annual return from their superannuation fund although 
they will receive little joy much less advantage from doing so. 
 
 
10. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The compulsory Superannuation Guarantee has brought about substantial changes to the 
Australia superannuation sector.  Coverage of employees under the New Superannuation 
System is high as 91 per cent of all employees are covered.  The provision of retirement 
benefits has been individualised as most employees (over 80 per cent) are members of a 
defined contribution or accumulation fund which means that the members bear the 
investment risk.  Most (some fifty per cent) are members of a retail fund; retail funds are 
characterised by low investment returns (relative to a standard benchmark) and high cost with 
a total expense ratio exceeding two per cent of assets under management.  Retail funds have 
been shown to be inefficient in producing good returns for members as these funds under-
perform by up to 90 basis points a year; in addition their expense ratio is high at about 150 
points a year and entry and exit fees account for 3.5 per cent of funds under management. 
 
Another significant proportion of employees are members of industry funds which have, on 
average, low accumulated balances.  The existence of low balances adds to the costs of the 
system; consolidating the fragmented holdings of members can effect substantial savings. 
 
Overall, we find that the New Superannuation System is inefficient, low return and high cost.  
One major inefficiency is the fragmentation of accounts so that, on average, members have 
three accounts.  
 
We find that this inefficiency is due to a lack of competition and the existence of severe 
principal-agent problems, in particular, trustees do not appear to act in the interests of their 
members.  The preferred policy solution is to allow for unrestricted member choice of fund 
and unrestricted portability of accumulated balances. 
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